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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-STATE PuBiIC UTILITY
COmmIIISsIoN HoLDs THAT SECTION 13a(1) OF THE TRANSPORTATION
ACT OF 1958 VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
After denial of a railroad's application to the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission (PUC) for permission to abandon service on the intra-
state portion of a line running between points in Pennsylvania and Mary-
land, the carrier gave notice to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
public, and the PUC of its intention to discontinue the entire route, pur-
suant to section 13a(1) of the Transportation Act of 1958 and procedures
prescribed thereunder by the ICC. Although the notice stated that objec-
tions to the discontinuance should be filed with the ICC by February 11,
1962, the ICC announced on February 8 that no hearing would be con-
ducted. The railroad was therefore free to abandon the line thirty days
after its notice was filed. The Pennsylvania PUC, after issuing a rule
to show cause why its first order should not be obeyed, held that the pro-
cedure authorized by the federal statute constituted a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment. Penn-
sylvania R.R., Application Docket No. 87818, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
July 9, 1962.1 This contention was subsequently rejected by a three-judge
district court in a connected action.
2
Section 13a(1) provides that, regardless of any state decision or
proceeding, railroads have authority to abandon interstate lines thirty days
1 The railroad has filed a complaint to enjoin enforcement of the PUC order.
Pennsylvania MR. v. Sharfsin, Civil No. 7810, M.D. Pa., Aug. 9, 1962.
The PUC limited its declaration of unconstitutionality to cases in which § 13a(1)
"purports to supersede a state order . . . without affording the state a hearing or
without even making a finding that there is an undue burden between the intrastate
aspects and the interstate aspects." Instant case at 9.
Administrative agencies probably lack power to declare unconstitutional a statute
they are asked to administer. See 3 DAVIs, ADmINISTRATIV LAW TREATSE, § 20.04,
at 74 n.1 (1958). Contra, Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 17 B.T.A. 757,
764-68, 774-75 (1929), aff'd on other grounds, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933), rev'd on
other grounds, 292 U.S. 371 (1934).
The proper inquiry is what the legislature intended, and presumably it did not
intend that the agency it created should be able to overrule its will as enacted in
legislation. See 3 DAvis, op. cit. supra, § 20.04, at 74. When an agency declares
unconstitutional a statute that interferes with its jurisdiction, however, the issue is
different Cf. Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1943),
vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947). The legislature may have intended that the
PUC could make such a determination. However, there is no discussion of this
question in the instant PUC opinion.
2 The court dismissed an action by a union representing railway employees to
force the ICC to investigate the discontinuance. Sludden v. United States, 211 F.
Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
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after filing notice with the ICC, if the Commission decides not to conduct
an investigation 3  ICC regulations implementing section 13a(1) require
that the railroad advise the public and the state regulatory agency that
objections should be filed with the ICC by a certain date.4 The statute was
invoked in New Jersey v. United States,5 which concerned abandonment
of a ferry plying between a point in New Jersey and one in New York.
Extended hearings had been held prior to the passage of section 13a(1),
after which the ICC had approved abandonment, but a three-judge dis-
3 A carrier or carriers subject to this chapter, . . . [operating] any
train or ferry . . . from a point in one State to a point in any other State
or in the District of Columbia, or from a point in the District of Columbia
to a point in any State, . . . may, but shall not be required to, file with
the Commission, and upon such filing shall mail to the Governor of each
State in which such train or ferry is operated, and post in every station,
depot or other facility served thereby, notice at least thirty days in advance
of any such proposed discontinuance or change. The carrier or carriers filing
such notice may discontinue or change any such operation or service pursuant
to such notice except as otherwise ordered by the Commission pursuant to
this paragraph, the laws or constitution of any State, or the decision or
order of, or the pendency of any proceeding before, any court or State
authority to the contrary notwithstanding. Upon the filing of such notice
the Commission shall have authority during said thirty days' notice period,
either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, to enter
upon an investigation of the proposed discontinuance or change. Upon the
institution of such investigation, the Commission . . . may require such train
or ferry to be continued in operation or service, in whole or in part, pending
hearing and decision in such investigation, but not for a longer period than
four months beyond the date when such discontinuance or change would
otherwise have become effective. If . . . the Commission finds that the
operation or service of such train or ferry is required by public convenience
and necessity and will not unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce,
the Commission may by order require the continuance or restoration cf oper-
ation or service of such train or ferry, in whole or in part, for a period not
to exceed one year from the date of such order. . . . On the expiration of
an order by the Commission after such investigation requiring the continu-
ance or restoration of operation or service, the jurisdiction of any State as
to such discontinuance or change shall no longer be superseded unless the
procedure provided by this paragraph shall again be invoked by the carrier
or carriers.
72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1958). (Emphasis added.) A comment on the
statute appears in 57 MicE. L. :Rv. 1258 (1959). Congress clearly intended § 13a(1)
to authorize such discontinuances without a required hearing. 104 CONG. REc. 10863
(1958) (remarks of Senator Russell); 57 MicE. L. REv. 1258, 1259 rL1O (1959).
Congress has apparently provided no judicial review if the ICC fails to act, except
a challenge on constitutional grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958). See New
Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 328-30 (D.N.J. 1958), affd per curian,
359 U.S. 27 (1959), suggesting that mandamus is a possible remedy if the ICC abuses
its discretion. Id. at 334-35.
Congressional legislation before the enactment of § 13a(1) required a hearing
by the ICC prior to authorization of railroad abandonments. 41 Stat. 477 (1920),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18)-(19) (1958). The ICC could authorize only total
abandonment of lines, not partial discontinuances. New Jersey v. New York, S. &
W.R.R., 83 Sup. Ct. 614, 616 (1963) (dictum).
4 The notice must contain:
advice to the public that persons desiring to object to the proposed discon-
tinuance or change should notify the Interstate Commerce Commission . . .
of such objection and the reasons therefor at least 15 days before the effective
date of the proposed discontinuance or change.
49 C.F.R. § 43.4(d) (Supp. 1962); see 49 C.F.R § 43.5(j) (Supp. 1962).
G 168 F. Supp. 324, 327-28 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 27 (1959).
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trict court reversed on jurisdictional grounds.6 After the statute was
passed, the railroad gave the requisite notice to the ICC, which declined
to hold a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed this refusal per curiam.
The present PUC opinion distinguishes New Jersey on the ground that
it concerned abandonment of wholly interstate commerce, whereas the
instant case involves intrastate commerce as well.7 This distinction rests
on the doubtful premise that Congress is bound by stricter procedural due
process requirements when its legislation governs intrastate commerce
than when it regulates interstate commerce.8 Arguably, Congress itself
made this distinction in section 13a(2) by requiring a hearing before wholly
intrastate routes may be discontinued.9 This dichotomy was probably
motivated, however, more by political than constitutional considerations."0
Since the opposing interests of the commuters and the Government are
not altered when the train crosses a state line, the procedural requirements
of due process should not be affected.
New Jersey is distinguishable, however, because the ICC had held a
hearing shortly before the enactment of section 13a(1) and had determined
that the discontinuance was justified; thus reversal in order to hold a
hearing would have been pointless."' The Supreme Court's per curiam
affirmance, therefore, does not necessarily represent a determination that
the procedures authorized by section 13a(1) satisfy the requirements of
due process.' 2
Section 13a(l) requires notice to the commuters and the state governor
at least thirty days before a discontinuance may be effected. An ICC rule
also requires the carrier to inform the public that they may protest to the
ICC until fifteen days prior to the proposed discontinuance. 3 Whether
the due process clause should be applied to measure the procedural protec-
tion granted by a statute has traditionally depended on whether any
6 The court held that the ICC had not been given jurisdiction to authorize partial
discontinuances. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 98
(D.N.J. 1957), vacated as moot, 359 U.S. 982 (1959). This decision was a factor
prompting Congress to extend the ICC's jurisdiction in § 13a(1). New Jersey v.
United States, supra note 5, at 337 (dissenting opinion).
7 Instant case at 16.
8 Congress' power to regulate commerce is subject to the due process require-
ment United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 282 U.S. 311, 327 (1931).
It was not contended that Congress exceeded the power granted by the commerce
clause. Instant case at 15. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 163 (1926)
(Congress may authorize abandonment of wholly intrastate railroad line). Nor is
a substantive due process issue raised. The Supreme Court is reluctant to test the
reasonableness of economic legislation by the due process clause. See Secretary of
Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1950). It asks only
whether the procedures authorized by Congress provided adequate safeguards to
protect interests that Congress admittedly can regulate.
9 72 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1958).
1O See 104 CoNG. REc. 10850 (1958) (remarks of Senator Russell) ; id. at 10858
(remarks of Senator Kefauver) ; id. at 10861 (remarks of Senator Russell).
"1 The standard for abandonment is similar under both statutes. Conpare 41
Stat. 477 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1958), with 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C.
§ 13a(1) (1958).
=But see Sludden v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
Is See note 4 supra.
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"person" has been deprived of "property." The only "persons" 14 in the
present case who will suffer as a result of the ICC inaction are passengers
who had used the line in question. Their interest in being furnished trans-
portation is probably not "property" under previous construction of the due
process clause,15 in contrast to the interest of engaging in a certain pro-
fession,'0 or public employment,17 or the substantive right to a reasonable
return from tangible property.' 8 Whether a railroad had the common law
right to abandon specific routes is not certain; 19 in any event, the due
process clause does not seem an appropriate means of protecting consumers
from such discontinuances.2 0  Their interest is merely the opportunity to
purchase goods or services produced by others, and such a slight commer-
cial interest is more appropriately regulated by Congress than by the
courts. 2 ' This is particularly true when, as here, the private interest is
spread among a number of persons; in this situation Congress' need to
legislate for the public interest may be so compelling that those adversely
affected are protected only by their voting power.22 Procedural due process
14 A state apparently cannot allege that it has been deprived of property without
due process of law, as it is not a "person" within the protection of due process. See
Scott v. Frazier, 258 Fed. 669, 671 (D.N.D. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 253 U.S.
243 (1920); State Tax Comm'n v. Baltimore Nat'l Bank, 174 Md. 403, 417-18, 199
Atl. 119, 125 (1938) (concurring opinion) (fifth amendment due process not intended
to protect the states); cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923).
Contra, New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 341 (D.N.J. 1958) (dis-
senting opinion), aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 27 (1959). It is also doubtful whether
a state can gain standing as parenr patriae to challenge the constitutionality of
federal legislation. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, mtpra at 485-86; Minnesota ex rel.
Lord v. Benson, 274 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1960). But cf. New York v. United States,
65 F. Supp. 856, 872 (N.D.N.Y. 1946) (alternative holding), aff'd on other grounds,
331 U.S. 284 (1947).
15 New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.NJ. 1958), aff'd per
curiam, 359 U.S. 27 (1959). Consumers' right to be supplied with gas is not "prop-
erty" within the meaning of due process. See United States Heat & Light Corp. v.
Gas & Elec. Light Co., 47 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 864 (1931) ;
O'Sullivan v. Feinberg, 201 Misc. 658, 663, 114 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519-20 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Ten Ten Lincoln Place, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 190 Misc. 174, 177, 73
N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd inem., 273 App. Div. 903, 77 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1948). Although these cases involved the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, they apparently are authority for construing the fifth amendment due
process clause as well. See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1009, 1011 n.19 (1962).
16Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (dictum); see Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957).
17 See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890); see FPC
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
19 See generally Note, 18 INTRAMURAL L. REv. 127, 129-32 (1963). Compare
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Henning, 8 Fed. Cas. 1045 (No. 4666) (C.C.D. Kan.
1878), ith San Antonio St. Ry. v. State ex rel. Elmendorf, 90 Tex. 520, 39 S.W.
926 (1897).
20 Under traditional terminology, see 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 1, § 7.11, at 453,
the consumers! interest would probably be called a "privilege," not a "right," and
thus not entitled to the protection of a hearing.
21 Cf. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (dictum);
Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 617 (1950) (dictum).
22 Several bills have been introduced to amend or repeal § 13a(1), which, although
unsuccessful, indicate that voters can influence such legislation. See, e.g., H.R.
11538, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; S. 3020, H.R. 9742, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
S. 1450, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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operates more properly to protect the individual, whose singular interest
has been severely damaged by governmental action,2 3 or whose personal
liberty has been impaired.
It thus appears that Congress was not constitutionally compelled to
provide any procedures to protect commuters from route discontinuances,
whether interstate or intrastate. The current approach to due process,
however, indicates that traditional notions of "property" do not always
provide ready answers to constitutional requirements; rather than being
limited by the "life, liberty, or property" categories of the fifth amendment,
modern courts ask whether a private "interest" is being affected.24 It
therefore seems appropriate to determine whether, under the more liberal
approach, procedural due process requires that a hearing be provided under
section 13a(1).
To ascertain the procedures required by due process in each case, the
potential impairment of the government interest caused by granting those
procedures 2 5 must be balanced against the predictable substantive injury
to the private interests affected 26 The balancing process has been primarily
employed in cases of personal injury, but it seems equally appropriate in
the area of economic regulation-although the private interest is often
less substantial. The most recent relevant Supreme Court decision on
procedural due process is Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,2 7 in which the
Court held that no hearing was required when a cook lost her job 2 8 at a
privately owned cafeteria on a military installation because of summary
revocation of her security clearance. Obviously, an individual's interest
in specific employment is more weighty than a passenger's " interest in a
particular form of transportation; and the possibility of stigmatizing the
enployee, emphasized by the dissent, 30 but dismissed by the majority,3 1
does add to the individual interest in Cafeteria Workers. On the other
23 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
24Due process protection is not limited to traditional concepts of "vested" prop-
erty rights. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961)
(dictum). "Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process of law." Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
2 5 See Note, 110 U. PA. L. R-v. 1009, 1022-23 (1962).
261d. at 1019. Subsidiary considerations are the Government's own interest in
providing procedures that appear to be fair and will in fact lead to sound decisions,
id. at 1023, and its need for freedom to experiment in the complex task of economic
regulation.
27367 U.S. 886 (1961).
28 The evidence indicated that other jobs were available to her. Id. at 888, 898-99.
29 For due process balancing purposes, the interest of one employee should be
weighed against the interest of one passenger; in Cafeteria Workers, the decision
will affect all similarly situated employees, just as determination of the present case
will affect all passengers. In determining whether the interest in transportation was
"property," and whether due process should apply at all, however, see -text accom-
panying notes 14-23 suPra, the dilution of the "individual" interest among many persons
was a major consideration.
so 367 U.S. at 901-02 (dissenting opinion).
81367 U.S. at 898.
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hand, Cafeteria Workers involved a slight impairment of the paramount
governmental interest in national security; a hearing would force the Gov-
ernment to disclose the names of its informants and the sources of its
information.
In the present situation, the Go-?ernment has strong justification for
not providing an ifivestigation and hearing. One of the purposes of this
legislation was to permit the depressed railroads to abandon unprofitable
routes without delay. 2  The procedures prescribed under section 13a(1)
indicate the congressional concern with dispatch: the ICC must decide
within thirty days whether or not to investigate a proposed discontinuance;
the duration of ICC temporary orders to maintain the routes pending the
investigation is limited to four months; and permanent orders are limited
to one year, after which the carrier may reapply for authority to discon-
tinue.P The ICC has estimated that a mandatory hearing in every dis-
continuance case, with the possibility of judicial review-which is un-
available when the ICC exercises its discretion to refrain from action 4 _.,
would delay contested discontinuances for at least two years.8 5 Alterna-
tives to full hearings, such as greater reliance on hearing examiners, or
expedited hearings, might well afford more protection to passengers and
greater recognition of the state's interest; but the probability that these
procedures would also be subject to judicial review lessens only insub-
stantially the probable impairment of the government interest. Thus, the
impairment of the governmental interest in Cafeteria Workers seems no
more significant than that in the present case, in which the less compelling
interest in regulating commerce would be more substantially impaired by
the necessity of judicial review and the time consumed even by expedited
procedures.
The potential impairment to the government interest in the present
case, therefore, outweighs the comparatively slight predictable injury to
a passenger, so that no procedural protection-such as automatic hearing-
is required beyond the existing statutory procedures. Moreover, the rules
subsequently issued by the ICC afford additional safeguards against arbi-
trary action. The railroad must inform the ICC of the following facts:
interchanging and alternative means of transportation, the traffic for the
past two years, the route's loss or profit, and the carrier's general finan-
cial position3 6 Such information should permit the ICC to make an
32 See Wells, A Review of Interstate Commerce Commission Section 13a De-
cisions, 27 ICC PRAc. J. 821-22 (1960); 57 MICH. L. REV. 1258 (1959).
= 72 Stat 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1958).
3460 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958); New Jersey v. United States,
168 F. Supp. 324, 329-30 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 27 (1959). A
hearing and an order by the ICC in a contested action would be subject to judicial
review. 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1958).
3 5 Brief for the ICC, p. 34, New Jersey v. United States, mspra note 34.
3649 C.F.R. §§43.5(e)-(i) (Supp. 1962). For discussion of factors relevant
to the propriety of railroad discontinuances, see Conant, Railroad Service Discon-
tinuances, 43 MINN. L. REv. 275 (1958); Thomas, Discontinuance of Railroad
Service, Annual Survey of the Law of New Jersey, 1958-1959, 14 RuTGERs L. RE-v.
345, 347-49 (1960) ; Wells, supra note 32, at 824-29; Note, supra note 19, at 133-42.
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informed judgment on the need for investigation of proposed discon-
tinuances.3 7
The due process balancing approach, however, does indicate that the
section 13a(1) thirty-day notice, and the ICC rule requiring the railroad
to give fifteen days notice of opportunity to object, are constitutionally
required to protect even these relatively slight private interests. These
provisions assure minimum notice to passengers and do not significantly
impair the government interest by delaying the proposed discontinuance.
In the present case the PUC's ill-considered holding that the statute
was unconstitutional may have been provoked by the ICC's flagrant viola-
tion of its own rules38 The railroad's notice of January 24, 1962 in-
dicated that objections were to be filed with the ICC by February 11, the
fifteen-day limit before discontinuance could be permitted. Three days
prior to that deadline, however, the ICC determined that no hearing would
be held.3 9 On that same day, February 8, the PUC mailed to the ICC
its petition for leave to intervene and object to the discontinuance. 0
Although the ICC was certainly under no duty to grant the petition had
it waited until the announced deadline for the submission of briefs, by
making its decision 41 prior to the authorized deadline it deprived the
PUC of the opportunity of countering the railroad's possibly one-sided
presentation of the facts.
Whether or not these ICC rules, distinguished from the statutory
procedures, are required by procedural due process,42 there is no reason
to reverse the Commission's action unless it caused substantial prejudice to
an interested party.4 Vacating the refusal to investigate would serve no
purpose: a judicial order to investigate would clearly violate the statutory
3
7 Over a three-year period, the ICC received 66 notices of proposed discontinu-
ances, 57 of which were investigated by the Commission. See 75 ICC AN. REP.
73-74 (1961); 74 ICC ANN. REP. 62 (1960); 73 ICC A.r. REP. 53-54 (1959).3 8 See instant case at 4, 10; note 4 supra.
39 ICC Notice, Finance Docket No. 21936, Feb. 8, 1962.
40 Instant case at 4.
41 The ICC subsequently refused a rehearing, but addressed itself to other protests
that had been received, saying that they had been received after the ICC's power
to investigate had expired. ICC Order, Finance Docket No. 21936, March 23, 1962.
The Chairman of the ICC later wrote that the ICC knew of the PUC hearings, but
that the ICC's data, unlike that presented to the PUC, showed that there was "minimal
use" of the route, which was causing "substantial losses." Letter From Chairman
Rupert L. Murphy to Al H. Chesser, National Legislative Representative, Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen, March 28, 1962.
42 Compare text following note 23 supra, svith text following note 37 supra.
43 Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F2d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 872 (1958). In Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), the Secretary of the
Interior was reversed for violating his own rules in a loyalty discharge case, although
the employee could have been discharged summarily and without cause. The Court
held that procedural requirements for security discharges, once adopted, must be
followed when dismissal is grounded on security reasons. The opinion does not
make clear whether its reversal is based on constitutional or supervisory grounds.
See id. at 539. Mr. Justice Frankfurter views it as a "judicially evolved rule of
administrative law .. . ." Id. at 547 (separate opinion). Compare Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954). The Court's decree reinstating the employee, subject to any
future lawful dismissal, 359 U.S. at 546, entitled the employee to almost five years'
back pay. See id. at 535, 537. No corresponding benefit to the private interest would
result from reversal in the present case.
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scheme of leaving discretion to investigate with the ICC; an order that the
ICC redetermine whether or not to investigate seems futile, since it is un-
likely that the ICC would now voluntarily reverse itself.44 This, then, is a
case in which judicial supervision over ICC practices can better be accom-
plished by strong language than by reversal. It is to be hoped, however,
that the ICC will avoid a recurrence of the needless friction of the present
situation by making every effort to conform to its own sound procedural
rules.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF NEGRO
CANDIDATES HELD NOT ABRIDGED BY STATE STATUTE REQUIRING
DESIGNATION OF THERa RACE ON THE BALLOT
Two Negro school board candidates brought suit in federal district
court to enjoin disclosure of their race on the primary election ballot 1
pursuant to a Louisiana statute.2 In denying the injunction, a three-judge
district court 3 held, one judge dissenting, that the constitutional rights
of the plaintiffs were not abridged by a statute that required designation of
the race of all candidates to appear on the ballot. Anderson v. Martin, 206
F. Supp. 700 (E.D. La. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3260
(U.S. Feb. 18, 1963) (No. 684).
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection does not stop with the
prohibition of physical segregation by race in state supported facilities. 4
It also generally proscribes state aid of private discrimination which the
state itself could not require or perpetrate.6 Even when a legitimate state
44 See note 41 supra.
1 Both plaintiffs requested injunctive relief against the Secretary of State of
Louisiana prior to the July 28, 1962 Democratic primary, in which they were candi-
dates for the school board in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1174.1 (Supp. 1961):
A. Every application for . . . candidacy . . . shall show . . . whether
such candidate is of the Caucasian race, the Negro race or other specified race.
C. On the ballots . . . in any state or local primary, general or special
election the Secretary of State shall cause to be printed within parentheses
( ) beside the name of each candidate, the race of the candidate, whether
Caucasian, Negro, or other specified race. . . . [This is to be] the same
size as the print in the names of the candidates on the ballots.
3 The court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (Supp. III, 1962).
4As to physical segregation, see, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement
Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Anderson v. Courson, 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962) (voting places).
5 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 177-85 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Henkin, Shelley
v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 490 (1962);
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1959) ; cf. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum.
L. REv. 1083, 1108-20 (1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv.
3, 44-52 (1961). But cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1959).
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interest was being served, state laws which would require disclosure of
membership in organizations promoting Negro equality have been held
constitutionally inapplicable when such disclosure was likely to subject
members to private abuse.6 In McDonald v. Key,7 the case closest on its
facts to the present one, the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma statute 8
that required ballot designation only of the race of Negro candidates was
an impermissible denial of equal protection.
The court in the present case distinguished McDonald v. Key on the
ground that the Oklahoma statute treated Negroes differently from all other
candidates, whereas the Louisiana statute treats all candidates alike.9 Yet
the practical effect of both statutes is to identify Negroes. Since almost
all candidates in both states are either Negro or white, the Louisiana stat-
ute merely makes explicit the obvious implication under the Oklahoma
statute that all candidates without Negro labels are white.'0 Rationally, a
different result should not follow from such a superficial distinction. Yet
the court found that the distinction reached constitutional solidity by utiliz-
ing the presumption of constitutionality normally applicable to statutes
involving economic classification. 1 In challenging such legislation, a liti-
gant claiming a denial of equal protection must prove that the statute
results in some inequality and does not rest upon any reasonable basis.'2
The court found equality of treatment on the face of the statute and no
"proven discrimination to which the state was privy." 13 It thought the
statute otherwise justifiable because it "merely contributes to a more in-
formed electorate." 14 The court ignored the principle that when statutes
classify by race, "there may be narrower scope for [the] operation of the
presumption of constitutionality"; 15 such statutes, whose validity is "imme-
6 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In
Shelton, but not in Bates and NAACP, the state had a legitimate interest in acquiring
the information. Shelton v. Tucker, supra at 485. The *Court thought, however,
that the means used to implement the state interest was unconstitutional when weighed
against the members! freedom of association. See The Supreme Court, 1961 Term,
75 HARv. L. REv. 80, 129 (1962). See also Note, Freedom of Association: Consti-
tutional Right or Judicial Techniquef,'46 VA. L. Rnv. 730 (1960).
7224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955).
8 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 162(a) (1955):
Every candidate shall state in his notification and declaration his race. Any
candidate who is other than of the White race, shall have his race desig-
nated upon the ballots in parenthesis after his name.
9 Instant case at 703-04.
10 See id. at 705 (dissenting opinion). In 1960, Louisiana had a population of
3,257,022. There were 2,211,715 whites, 1,039,207 Negroes, and only 6,100 persons
of other races. U.S. ComM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTS, TnE 50 STATES REPORT 181 (1961).
11 See instant case at 704 n26.
12 E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957).
il Instant case at 704.
14 Id. at 702.
15 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(dictum) :
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution ....
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diately suspect," 16 are to be "scrutinized with particular care, since they
are contrary to our traditions." 17
All citizens are free to discriminate among candidates on the basis
of race and to urge others to do the same.18 It seems equally patent, how-
ever, that a state has no right to facilitate and stimulate such private dis-
crimination.' 9 As the Supreme Court stated in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,2 "the crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private
action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power . . . that
private action takes hold." And, the present court's view to the contrary
notwithstanding, a failure to show actual discrimination need not bar the
plaintiffs' claim. In Shelton v. Tucker,2 ' the Supreme Court did not require
proof, but appears to have taken notice that state disclosure of an in-
dividual's membership in organizations promoting Negro equality would
most likely unleash private prejudice.22 Yet, in enacting the statute in-
volved in the present case, Louisiana, which has a long standing and state
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at . . . racial minorities, . . . whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
Supreme Court decisions prior to Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), "indicate
that scrutiny of state legislation in [the civil liberties] . . . area should be stricter
than in matters of economic regulation." The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, supra
note 6, at 129. One writer, after examining cases subsequent to Carolete Prods.,
has gone so far as to say that "when race is the criterion, the presumption of constitu-
tionality is reversed." Note, Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact, and Con-
stitutional Law, 29 GEo. WAsir. L. R v. 136, 141-43 (1960).
16Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944):
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence
of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
17 Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
18The Supreme Court, however, has scrupulously guarded the Negro's right to
vote as guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment even against infringements which
ostensibly result from private rather than state action. See Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
19 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Terry v. Adams,
supra note 18; Smith v. Allwright, supra note 18. "In regard to elections, company
towns, public parking authorities, and the like, the Constitution requires the state
not to be neutral, but to act to prevent inequality or other infringements." Henkin,
supra note 5, at 489.
20357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
21364 U.S. 479 (1960). See also authorities cited note 5 supra.
22 Note, 36 IND. L.J. 306, 310 (1961); see Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 21, at
485-87.
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sanctioned custom of segregation 2 based on the alleged inferiority of the
Negro race,2 4 appears to be making a thinly veiled attempt to facilitate
discrimination by the majority white electorate which outnumbers the
Negro electorate by more than six to one on a statewide basis and by more
than three to one in virtually every parish.2s The statute cannot be justified
on the ground that it helps to inform the voters, for the only conceivable
purpose of the information conveyed on the ballot is to enable people to
"vote their prejudices." As the Supreme Court did in the case of a more
defensible statute in Shelton,26 the court in the present case should have
taken notice that the Louisiana statute, which has no apparent legitimate
purpose whatsoever, would almost surely lead to private discrimination
against the Negro candidatesm27 The court's assertion that in any event
a candidate's race was likely to be disclosed in the campaign 28 refutes the
alleged need to inform the electorate and does not warrant the state's assist-
ing that disclosure. Nor does it negate the effect of placing the state's
power and prestige behind the ballot's invitation to the voter to make his
choice on racial grounds.
Although the Louisiana statute denied the Negro candidates equal
protection by subjecting them to an unjustified but probable loss of votes,
the very fact that it classifies by race may suffice to invalidate it without
a showing of palpable injury. Brown v. Board of Educ. a declared "sepa-
rate but equal" public school facilities unconstitutional because of the feeling
2
3Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 179-81 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) ;
La. Acts 1960, No. 630, at 1200: "WHERaAs, Louisiana has always maintained a
policy of segregation of the races, and WHEREAS, it is the intention of the citizens
of this sovereign state that such a policy be continued."
24 See generally Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948); Note,
Constitutionality of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes, 58 YALE L.J. 472 (1949).
25Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 4, instant case. As of December 31, 1960, there were
992,684 registered white voters in Louisiana. In contrast, there were only 158,765
registered Negro voters. Moreover, in only five of the sixty-four parishes did
Negroes constitute more than 307 of the registered voters. The highest percentage
was 42%. The plaintiffs in the present case were seeking office in East Baton Rouge
Parish, where there were 66,041 white and 10,573 Negro registered voters. U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 50 STATES REPORT 214-15 (1961).
2 See note 6 supra.
2 7 Louisiana would hardly be in a position to complain. Under its code of
criminal procedure, Louisiana's courts may take judicial notice of "the political, social
and racial conditions prevailing in this state'" LA. REV. STAT. § 15-422(6) (1950).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has taken notice that the average white man would
be prone to be prejudiced against Negroes on trial for assaulting a white man. State
v. Bessa, 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985 (1905). In Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961), the majority, in holding that there was no evidence to support the convictions
of Negroes for disturbing the peace by "sitting in' at lunch counters, found that the
state trial court had not taken judicial notice of the likelihood of public disturbances.
Id. at 173. They also intimated that it would be a denial of due process for a trial
court, without informing counsel, to take notice of facts necessary to support a
criminal conviction. Ibid. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, argued that
the existence of racial tensions in Louisiana "was so notorious throughout the country
that far from its being unconstitutional for a court to take it into consideration, it
would be quite amiss for us not to deem that the Louisiana courts did so on their
own initiative." Id. at 194. See generally id. at 193-96.
28 Instant case at 703.
22347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of inferiority engendered in Negro children by- segregation based solely
on race.30 Subsequent per curiam opinions 3 1 invalidating other state
segregation statutes on the authority of Brown indicate that the racial
classification itself is the gravamen of the injury in state segregation
schemes. 32 These decisions signify judicial recognition that "the function
of Jim Crow Jaws [is] to make identification as a Negro a matter of
stigma." a3 Although designation by race on an election ballot does not
have as great a psychological impact on Negro candidates as physical
segregation, it too should be struck down since "it is the stamp of
classification by race that makes the classification invidious" 34 and un-
constitutional.3 5
A state in its official actions has violated the guarantee of equal pro-
tection when it interferes with an individual's activities on the basis of race
alone.36 It should not be able to compel a candidate to furnish racial in-
formation and more clearly should not be able to place such information on
the ballot, for this constitutes an assertion by the state that it considers
race to be significantly related to the candidate's fitness to hold office.
37
A state would be on stronger ground were it to place photographs of all
candidates on the ballot to aid voters in identifying the candidates. Never-
theless, even photographs, like labels, should be impermissible, for the risk
of abuse far outweighs the potential legitimate benefits. As the dissent
suggests, "If there is one area above all others where the Constitution is
color-blind, it is the area of state action with respect to the ballot and the
voting booth." 
38
3 1 Id. at 494.
31 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City
of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf course) ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses).
32The unacceptability of racial classification as a premise for governmental
action is based on the dual beliefs that such classifications are so susceptible of abuse
that only by their elimination can such abuse be prevented, and that any restraint
on a Negro based purely on race is an arbitrary interference with his rights as an
individual. Comment, 59 MicH. L. REv. 1054, 1071-72 (1961).
33 Pollak, s1pra note 5, at 28. Labeling a white person as a Negro is libel
per se in jurisdictions having a custom of segregation. Natchez Times Publishing
Co. v. Dunigan, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So. 2d 681 (1954); Upton v. Times-Democrat
Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900); see PROSsER, TORTS 577 (2d ed.
1955).3
4 Instant case at 705 (dissenting opinion).
3 -5 See Pollak, supra note 5, at 28; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 139 (1951).
36 See Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd sub norn. Faubus
v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.),
appeal dinhissed, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959) ; Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 731-32, 198
P.2d 17, 29 (1948) (state anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional as they "violate
the equal protection of the laws clause . . by impairing the right of individuals
to marry on the basis of race alone . . "); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
185 (1941) (concurring opinion) (race described as "constitutionally an irrele-
vance") ; Wollett, Race Relations, 21 LA. L. REv. 85, 92 (1960) ; Comment, 59
MIcH. L. Rar. 1054, 1071 (1961); cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (dictum) (statute which would require adherents of par-
ticular religions or political parties to wear identifying armbands said to be clearly
unconstitutional).
37 See Wollett, supra note 36, at 92.
3
8 Instant case at 705 (dissenting opinion).
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CRIMINAL LAW-NEIu:r MAPP v. OHIO NOR THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT RENDERS WIRETRAP EVIDENCE INADMISsiBLE
IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Defendants were convicted in a state criminal proceeding largely on
the basis of wiretrap evidence obtained by New York police pursuant to a
court order.' In affirming, the New York Court of Appeals held 2 that
Mapp v. Ohio a did not require exclusion of wiretrap evidence in state
courts. People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d
406, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).4
Although Mapp v. Ohio now bars the admission in state trials of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, the
United States Supreme Court had held in Olmstead v. United States, over
vigorous dissents, that wiretapping was not an unreasonable search and
seizure.5 Since the Olmstead decision, Congress has made wiretapping a
federal crime,6 and the Court has proscribed the use of wiretap evidence in
federal courts on the ground that the statute includes federal police officers
within its prohibition of divulgence of telephone communications.? The
Court has, however, refused to require exclusion of wiretap evidence in
state courts. s
1 See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
2 Three judges dissented on the ground that courtroom use of wiretap evidence
in violation of the Federal Communications Act should be barred as a matter of New
York law.
8367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 The New Jersey Supreme Court would apparently reach the same conclusion.
See State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 183 A.2d 1 (1962). In Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1961), the court upheld the refusal by a district judge to enjoin a state
prosecution in which wiretap evidence was to be used or to convene a three-judge
district court to consider whether the New York wiretap provisions, see note 34
infra, were unconstitutional. It declared, in dictum, that Mapp had not overruled
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), thus implying that Mapp does not require
exclusion of wiretap evidence. Id. at 96.
45 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justices Brandeis, Holmes,
Stone, and Butler dissented. Mr. Justice Brandeis stressed the danger of a too literal
interpretation of the fourth amendment and argued that the underlying purpose of
the amendment-protection of the individual's right of privacy---extends to wire-
tapping. Id. at 471-85 (dissenting opinion).
I No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assist-
ing in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission
or reception, to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney,
or to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to
its destination, . . . and no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person ....
Federal Communications Act § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
T Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1937). In Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court prohibited admission of any evidence pro-
cured through knowledge gained by wiretapping. The exclusionary rule extends
to intrastate telephone calls. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
s Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458
(1961) (alternative holding). A major premise of the Court's reasoning in Schwartz
was an analogy to the now-overruled non-exclusionary rule in Wolf v. Colorado,
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When the Court first held that the core of the fourth amendment was
applicable to the states, it concluded in Wolf v. Colorado 9 that the exclu-
sionary rule as enforced in the federal system 10 had been based on the
Court's supervisory power over the lower federal courts 1' and need not be
extended to state trials because of the availability of other remedies against
police lawlessness.' 2  Those remedies have been ineffective for many rea-
sons,13 perhaps primarily because law enforcement officials have been
reluctant to forego easy convictions. Indeed, some states which frequently
faced the matter adopted an exclusionary rule as the only means of en-
forcing the federal constitution. 14 Thus, upon reconsideration of Wolf in
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court concluded that if fourth amendment rights were
to be protected against state invasion, exclusion must be considered an
"essential part" of that amendment 15 and must therefore extend to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. There appears to be only one effec-
tive and practicable way of enforcing those rights, and rights without
remedy are of little value. Therefore, it seems eminently reasonable to call
that remedy an essential part of the fourth amendment.'0 Now that an
unreasonable search can lead to a lost case, prosecutors and others who
supervise state police activities are encouraging obedience to the Constitu-
tion through the issuance of detailed instructions to policemen regarding
338 U.S. 25 (1949). See 344 U.S. at 201. The Court in Schwartz took the position
that Congress did not manifest a clear intent to change state rules of evidence by
its enactment of § 605. But in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), a
unanimous Court held wiretap evidence gained by state officers, acting under state
law, inadmissible in federal criminal trials and declared in dictum that "Congress,
setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which
would contradict that section and that policy." Id. at 105-06. The Court's language
thus casts doubt on the present validity of the holding in Schwartz that Congress
did not intend to occupy the field so completely as to change state rules of evidence.
See Pugach v. Dollinger, stpra at 459 (dissenting opinion). Pugach is a per curiam
decision in a case that raised the problem of federal intervention to enjoin the use
of wiretapping in a state trial. Because intervention in the state proceeding was the
only problem directly before the Court, citation of Schwartz in that case should be
taken as, at most, an alternative holding.
9 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'oWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"1 Supervisory power is the power of the highest court in a system to impose
rules of procedure, not required by constitution or statutes, upon inferior courts in
the system as a matter of sound judicial policy. See generally Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960).
12This view is most clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Black, concurring, in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949). For a discussion of the non-exclusionary
rule in Wolf, see Perlman, Comment: Due Process and the Admissibility of Evi-
dence, 64 IA{v. L. REv. 1304 (1951).
13 See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
14 California and Delaware adopted exclusion by overruling earlier authority.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) ; Rickards v. State, 45 Del.
573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950). Other states have adopted the rule by statute. E.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.1 (Supp. 1961); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-19-25 (1956).
15 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
16 The Court's reasoning failed to persuade one member of the majority, Mr.
Justice Black, who thought that exclusion could be reached only by coupling the
fifth amendment's provision against compelled self-incrimination with the fourth
amendment and applying both to the states through the fourteenth amendment Mapp
v. Ohio, supra note 15, at 661-66 (concurring opinion).
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the constitutional limits on their search and seizure activities. 17 Although
an exclusionary rule may not entirely halt illegal searches, especially in the
limited area where police conduct is primarily designed to harass dis-
favored individuals and not to secure evidence, it will greatly strengthen
the right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments.' 8
Defendants in the present case argued that Mapp requires exclusion
of wiretap evidence in state trials. 19 Because wiretapping is said not to be
an unreasonable search and seizure,2 the relevance of Mapp may not imme-
diately be apparent. Yet the analogy to the Mapp approach to the search
and seizure problem is a strong one. Just as unreasonable search violates
the fourth amendment, interception and divulgence of telephone communica-
tions clearly are federal crimes under section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act.21 Although the fourth amendment says nothing about
exclusion, the Mapp Court concluded that the realities of police activity
necessitated reading in exclusion as part of the constitutional right. Simi-
larly, the wiretapping statute has consistently been violated, with the result
that numerous defendants have been convicted and far more numerous
innocent citizens have had their private messages audited.2 Although the
statute itself provides criminal penalties 23 and there is a remote possibility
of damages 2 or an injunction,2 5 it is patent that none of these remedies
is effective.2 6 The most frequent violators are police officers who are not
prosecuted because they are following official policy; the victims who can
show injury are usually not of a character likely to inspire confidence or
17 See, e.g., Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandords Problems for the Prosecutor,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 4, 5 (1962).
is Some recent commentators have suggested that when a particular defendant
is involved, the principal right to be protected by the fourth amendment is not the
right of privacy, but a right not to be convicted by unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence. See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
in 1961 SuPa, EwE Couar REvImw 35 (Kurland ed.), and materials therein cited.
1 instant case at 354, 183 N.E.2d at 690, 229 N.Y.S2d at 408-09.
2
0 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). A good case can be made,
however, for overruling Olmstead. See King, Wiretapping and Electronic Sur-
veillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 DIcK. L. REv. 17 (1961).
If the Court were prepared to overrule Olmstead, Mapp would dearly require ex-
clusion of wiretrap evidence. See id. at 21.
2148 Stat 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
2 2 See, e.g., authorities cited note 26 infra. See generally King, supra note 20.
23 See Federal Communications Act § 501, 48 Stat. 1100 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958). There have been several criminal prosecutions against
private individuals for wiretapping. See United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d
Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941).
24 See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
25 Buraek v. State Liquor Authority, 160 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). How-
ever, a federal court will not enjoin admission of wiretrap evidence in a state court.
Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961) ; see 60 CoLum. L. REv. 871, 876-77 (1960).
A further possibility may be an "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress" under the Civil Rights Act, Rxv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§1983 (1958).
26 See generally Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legis-
lative Proposal, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 165, 167-68, 185-86 (1952). Judge Clark's dissent
in Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.26 739, 748-49 (1960), also discusses the necessity for
thwarting the consistent pattern of violation of federal law in the wiretapping field.
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sympathy. However, unlike the fourth and fourteenth amendments, sec-
tion 605 is not primarily directed toward protection of the individual.
Instead, its purpose is to safeguard the integrity of the interstate com-
munications network.27  Nevertheless, there is compelling evidence that
the section's primary purpose can be served only by making wiretapping
unprofitable for its practitioners through exclusion of wiretap evidence.
The by-product of this endeavor-protection of individual defendants-is
certainly not inconsistent with the primary statutory purpose. It would
seem, then, that just as in the field of search and seizure, continued viola-
tion of the wiretap statute can be halted only by an exclusionary rule.
Furthermore, with respect to the Federal Communications Act, there is
even stronger reason for requiring exclusion: whereas the fourth amend-
ment is silent on the point, section 605 expressly proscribes unauthorized
divulgence, which has been interpreted to include courtroom testimony
2 8
The Supreme Court might properly find a constitutional basis for
requiring the exclusion of wiretap evidence from state trials 29 in its obliga-
tion to preserve the supremacy of federal law.30 Control of interstate tele-
phone communications-which necessarily encompasses intrastate calls 3 1
is clearly a problem for Congress, which has promulgated what appears to
be a complete regulation of the subject of interception and divulgence. If
that regulation's prohibition covers wiretapping by federal officers, it must
likewise apply to state officers. 32 Moreover, in Benanti v. United States,33
the Court expressed its opinion that Congress intended to occupy the field
and foreclose conflicting state rules. Thus, a state statute like that of
New York,34 which provides for a judicial proceeding in which the police
27 See discussion of section 605 and authorities cited note 32 infra.
28 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
29 That is, overrule the Schwartz case. See note 8 mipra and accompanying text.
30 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433,
439 (1940).
31 Cf. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
32 Whether Congress fully comprehended the sweep of its words in section 605
is a question now impossible to answer; other provisions of the Federal Communica-
tions Act occupied full attention in the hearings and debates. For an attempt to
interpret the scanty legislative history, see Note, 53 HARV. L. RFv. 863, 865-66 (1940).
In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court apparently concluded
that it had nothing available but the words of the statute from which to determine
congressional intent. The very least that can be assumed is an intention to safeguard
the means of communication from unauthorized interference, and the absence of any
exceptions to the relevant prohibition seems to support the Nardone conclusion that
the statute covers everyone.
33 355 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1957) (dictum).'
34 An ex parte order for eavesdropping . . . may be issued by any justice
of the supreme court or judge of a county court or of the court of general
sessions of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of [specified
public officers] . . . that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of crime may thus be obtained, and particularly describing the person or
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be over-
head [sic] or recorded and the purpose thereof, and, in the case of a tele-
graphic or telephonic communication, identifying the particular telephone
number or telegraph line involved.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a, as authorized by N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. The
statute limits the order to a period of two months or less, but an order may be
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may apply for permission to conduct a wiretap, seems directly contrary
to congressional policy. In addition, New York judges, who are bound by
the Constitution to respect federal law supremacy,3 5 permit the commission
of a federal crime by initially approving the wiretap and by subsequently
admitting its fruits.8 6 Concededly, New York has not attempted to grant
immunity from federal prosecution; nevertheless its laws are here so con-
trary to the spirit of the federal enactment as to be prohibited by the
supremacy clause.8 7  Therefore, the Supreme Court--especially after the
Mapp decision-could justifiably impose an exclusionary rule on the state
courts to effectuate the congressional policy expressed in section 605 as the
supreme law of the land. The very frequent violation of the wiretap
law, unchecked by present remedies, persuasively indicates the need for
exclusion.
Of course, section 605 is only a statutory provision, and the primary
responsibility for its enforcement rests with the legislative and executive
branches.0 8 Despite the notorious lack of enforcement and the Supreme
Court's refusals to require exclusion of wiretap evidence from state trials,3 9
Congress has failed to expand the language of section 605.50 Moreover,
the Justice Department actively favors wiretapping as a means of law en-
extended or renewed if "in the public interest." Ibid. N.Y. CoDE Camn. PRoc. § 813-b
permits eavesdropping by police officers without a court order only when there are
"reasonable grounds to believe (1) that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and
(2) that in order to obtain such evidence time does not permit an application to be
made for such a court order before such eavesdropping must commence." On the
New York law, see generally Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 197 (1956).
85 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
8 0 For cases in which judges refused to grant permission to conduct a wiretap
on these grounds, see In the Matter of Interception of Tel. Communications, 23 Misc.
2d 543, 198 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y. County Ct 1960); In the Matter of Interception
of Tel. Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170 N.Y.S2d 84 (Sup. Ct 1958). See also
Comment, 51 J. Cnm~. L., C. & P.S. 630 (1961).
8 7 See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1957) (dictum) ; cf. Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147
(1917); Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914). Compare Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), with Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). Judge Medina, concurring in United States ex rel.
Graziano v. McCann, 275 F.2d 284, 286 (2d Cir. 1960), expresses his view that the
New York wiretap procedure may be an invasion of defendant's right to due process
since it is so blatantly contrary to § 605.
88 Contrast this with the Courts primary responsibility to enforce the Bill of
Rights; if it fails to correct a constitutional abuse, generally no one will. Because
of that responsibility, the compulsion to announce the Mapp rule, even at the expense
of retroactivity of application, is far stronger than the compulsion to enforce a statute,
especially when, as here, so many law enforcement agencies have relied on the
Schwartz rule. Retroactivity would, perhaps, seem too high a price for doing a job
which Congress or the Justice Department could do if they would. Yet retroactivity
is not inevitable. See Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
See generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1960). In light of the difficulties retroactive overruling of Schwartz
would entail (e.g., a flood of petitions to overturn prior state convictions on wiretap
evidence), prospective overruling seems highly desirable. See also Bender, The
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
89 See cases cited note 8 supra.
40 On the other hand, Congress has rejected several attempts to weaken §605.
See, Long, The Wiretap Story, 38 Kansas City B.J., Summer 1962, p. 3.
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forcement.4 ' However, the factors which lead to legislative and executive
preference for the status quo do not compel judicial inaction or acquiescence.
The judiciary, in the light of section 605 and the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, must make its own decision whether to lend its processes to
encourage and participate in the consistent violation of the law.
Apart from supremacy clause arguments, exclusion in the present
case should have been required as a matter of state law.4 2 Since a federal
crime is committed each time wiretap evidence is presented in court, the
New York Court of Appeals has, in effect, sanctioned the commission of
federal crimes in state courtrooms. Such a decision hardly promotes public
respect for the law.
43
The foregoing discussion has assumed that there might be valid rea-
sons for reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to overrule Olmstead.
It may be best not to include wiretapping within the constitutional proscrip-
tion so that Congress will be free to make well-regulated exceptions to
the wiretapping statute should particularly troublesome areas of law en-
forcement so require. Since the Court does not have to overrule Olmstead
in order to enforce the present wiretap law, reconsideration of Olmstead
may well await a case in which it is unavoidable. In any event, the decision
in the instant case seems incorrect, both in its failure to deal with the issue
of federal law supremacy and in its refusal to establish a sound rule of
evidence as a matter of New York law. Discouragement of wiretapping
seems entirely desirable, at least until Congress enacts a new wiretap law,
not only because wiretapping clearly runs counter to present national policy,
but also because it represents a serious, though perhaps not unconstitu-
tional, intrusion upon personal privacy 44 without leading to markedly bet-
ter law enforcement 4 5
EMINENT DOMAIN-SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE WrTHI BENE-
FICIL USE OF PROPERTY FRoM NOISE AND FUMES CAUSED BY
ADJACENT MILITARY AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS HELD NOT A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL TAKING
Plaintiffs acquired homes close to a deactivated Air Force base, which
was subsequently converted into a busy jet air base. Although plaintiffs'
41 See Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
42At most, the New York Constitution authorizes the legislature to make rules
concerning wiretapping; it certainly cannot be read as requiring the admission of
wiretap evidence if there is an overriding policy to the contrary. See N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 12. State judges could well conclude that avoidance of commission of a
federal crime presents such a policy. For cases reaching this conclusion, see note 36
43 See instant case at 357, 183 N.E.Zd at 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (dissenting
opinion).
44 Wiretapping is carried on against reputable as well as disreputable members of
society and involves a general uncovering of an individual's affairs far beyond the
scope of the usual general search. See generally King, supra note 20; Schwartz,
On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1954).
45 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 44, at 160-61.
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property is outside the normal flying patterns of the jets, the noise, vibra-
tion, and smoke from the flights and mainten'ance activities at the base-'
interfered with the use and enjoyment of the residential properties, reducing
their values by forty to fifty-five percent.2 Plaintiffs brought an action
under the Tucker Act,3 claiming that their property had been taken with-
out just compensation in contravention of the fifth amendment.4 Judgment
adverse to the property owners was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, on the ground that there had been no physical invasion
of the property. Chief Judge Murrah dissented. Batten v. United States,
306 F2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3219 (U.S.
Jan. 7, 1963).
In the typical eminent domain situation it is well settled that actual
physical invasion of the property is a necessary element of a taking."
Courts have found takings by aircraft activity when the disturbance was
similar to that in the present case and the planes flew over claimant's land
at low levels.8 These decisions have been interpreted by the lower federal
courts to require physical invasion in aircraft-taking cases.7 To find a tak-
ing in United States v. Causby,8 the leading case on taking by aircraft, the
Supreme Court labored to establish that the airspace through which the
planes flew was owned by the claimant. Thus, while not binding authority
for any particular result absent physical invasion, the Causby decision does
seem to posit physical invasion of claimant's property as requisite to
recovery.
Yet the interference held to constitute a taking in Causby was not
caused by the physical occupation of the claimant's airspace, but rather, as
'Loud noises frequently made conversation and use of the telephone, radio, and
television impossible and also interrupted sleep. During engine operation the sound
pressure level often reached as much as 90 to 117 decibels on the plaintiffs' properties;
ear plugs are required for Air Force personnel at 95 decibels. For half of the year
a special fuel injection system was used which developed a black smoke during
take-off, occasionally leaving an oily deposit on the houses and laundry. Strong
vibrations caused windows and dishes to rattle. See instant case at 582.
2 See instant case at 583 n.3.
328 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958): "(a) The district courts shall have original juris-
diction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: . . . (2) Any other civil action
or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . .
upon the Constitution . .. ."
4 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
5 See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933); United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897);
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
6 See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl.
1959); Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958); cf.
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
7 See Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960) ; Freeman v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); cf. Nunnally v. United States,
239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
8328 U.S. 256 (1946). This case involved recurrent flights within seventy feet
of claimant's rooftops. The resulting noise and glare forced the property owner to
abandon his chicken business and greatly interfered with the residential use of the
property.
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in the present case, by the severe noise and other adverse consequences of
aircraft operations in close proximity to the inhabited structures on the
surface. It is not necessary to show that physical property has been
appropriated in order to award compensation, since "property" as used in
the fifth amendment means more than the mere physical thing and includes
the occupant's right to beneficial use. 9 Thus, to turn the decision on
physical invasion of claimant's airspace when the complaint alleged detri-
ment to the beneficial use of the surface, not inability to use the airspace, is
to select an arbitrary and unrelated incident as determinative. 10 Further-
more, ownership by the subjacent landholder of the lower levels of airspace
through which aircraft necessarily pass is no longer a viable concept. At the
time of the Causby decision the glide paths for take-off and landing were
not part of the "navigable airspace" as defined by Congress." Therefore,
the physical invasion theory could be read as requiring an invasion of some
part of claimant's property in order for there to be a taking. Congress has
since revised its definition to include these channels within the airspace
appropriated for the public domain.12 Yet, subsequent to this congressional
action, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Allegheny County,'3 found a taking
in circumstances nearly identical to the Causby situation. The Griggs deci-
sion made it clear that the Court does not find appropriation of physical
property an essential element of taking by aircraft. Hence, it is difficult
to see any relevant basis for the distinction on which the present case rests
-between interference emanating from overflights of the claimant's land
and interference from flights over nearby property. The decision should
be based solely on the substantiality of the harm to the beneficial use of the
surface.' 4
In an analogous case, Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,'5 claimant
alleged that his property had been taken because of the noise, smoke, and
fumes produced by the operations of a railroad on nearby property. A
tunnel through which the trains passed was located in close proximity,
though not adjacent, to claimant's land.16 The Court found that the inter-
ference caused by the noise, smoke, and fumes from the passing trains was
not compensable; but the dense smoke and fumes blown onto his property
by the fanning system of the tunnel did constitute a taking. Thus, the
9 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
10 See Note, Airplane Noises: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARv.
L. REv. 1581, 1584 (1961).
"1328 U.S. 256, 263-64 (1946).
1272 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1958). Had the complaint alleged in-
ability to build a tall structure because of low-level overflights, airspace ownership
theories would be relevant for the purpose of determining what was owned by the
subjacent landowner before Congress acted. The Supreme Court did not commit
itself to any one ownership theory in Causby. For discussion, see Noel, Airports
and their Neighbors, 19 TENN. L. REv. 563, 568-74 (1946).
'3 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
'4 See The Supreme Court, 1961 Tern, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 143 (1962).
'5233 U.S. 546 (1914).
16 This case arose in the District of Columbia; the tracks and tunnel were located
and constructed under the authority of Congress.
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Griggs decision was not unprecedented in finding a taking absent physical
appropriation when substantial interference from intangibles occurred.' 7
Possibly because of sparse land use in areas surrounding airports, the
requirement of low-level overflights seldom produced unjust results in the
era of propeller driven aircraft, since the noise, glare, and vibration may
not have been sufficiently intense to be a serious disturbance unless the
flights passed close to the surface. However, with the advent of the jet
as a common mode of transportation and the increasing development of
land surrounding airports, a rule requiring overflights for taking by aircraft
is obviously unfair and unworkable.
Elimination of the requisite of overflights in cases of interference
caused by noise or other intangibles would focus the full attention of the
courts on the substantiality of the harm. A substantial harm standard for
taking would no doubt increase the total amount of compensation paid by
the Government; but fear of a flood of claims which would raise the cost
of these governmental activities to unmanageable proportions seems unwar-
ranted.' 8 In situations in which smoke and noise cause the disturbance,
as for example, weapons testing and firing, frequency as well as intensity of
interference will remain crucial to the finding of a taking. 9 In Richards,
the Court distinguished between the noise, smoke, and fumes from the pass-
ing trains and the smoke and fumes from the tunnel fans; the former were
held to be part of the "common burden" of living in our society, whereas
the latter were "special" damages.20 This analysis would be fundamental
in applying the proposed standard. From its treatment of the facts it is
clear that the Court was not asserting that there was a meaningful differ-
ence in kind between the two disturbances; it is equally plain that the
claimant could not have been the only person whose property was subjected
to the output of the fanning system, since his property was not adjacent
to the tunnel.2 ' The apparent criterion was the amount of interference the
owners of private property must be asked to endure as incident to tech-
nological advance and necessary governmental activities. When the inter-
ference from a particular government installation is of the same severity as
17 Cf. Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330-32 (1883).
18 The courts' adoption of arbitrary standards defined in terms of physical prop-
erty appropriations may be explained by their desire for a sure cut-off point, in the
face of this fear of a vast mumber of claims. Such standards are used in other eminent
domain situations. See 109 U. PA. L. REV. 120 (1960) (impairment of access by
limited access highways); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 133, 137-38 (restrictive covenants).
-19 See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 326
(1922). Occasional interference from aircraft activity would also be insubstantial.
See Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960). Duration of
interference is also relevant; although the disturbance need not be permanent to
constitute a taking, its longevity will be important in determining the amount of
damages. See Causby v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 262 (Ct. Cl. 1948), in which
the disturbing flights ceased after four years, so that the damages were calculated
primarily on the basis of the loss in rental value for that period.
20 233 U.S. at 554, 557.
21 To make compensation turn on the fact that the interference has affected one
property owner exclusively leads to the unreasonable position of distinguishing the
situation in which an individual owns a large tract of land from one in which there
are many small properties.
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the disturbance to which property owners in general are exposed as a result
of governmental activity, to compensate for it is pointless, since the funds
for compensation are derived from taxation of the same "public" that is
compensated. However, when the impact on particular property owners
becomes more severe, the costs of compensation should be added to the
Government's costs of construction and operation.
In the present case, the rationale of Richards was apparently misun-
derstood. The majority adopted the district court's finding that the inter-
ference "'is of the same character as that noticed in varying degrees in the
general area surrounding the Base' with greater adverse effect on the plain-
tiffs because of the proximity of their property to the Base." 22 Yet, the
opinion later stated that the disturbance suffered by the plaintiffs was
common to all the neighboring private property. Obviously, the court did
not focus on the substantiality of the harm, but on the kind of interference
and the fact that it did not affect the plaintiffs exclusively. 4
The dissent in the Causby case asserted that the courts "do not possess
the techniques or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex
combinations of factors" involved in balancing the public and private
interests affected by air travel and the construction of airports, and that
settlement of these issues on constitutional grounds would hamper Con-
gress' freedom of action in resolving the problem. Congress may indeed
be better equipped to determine just how far from an airport the disturbance
becomes severe enough to justify adding the costs of compensation to the
costs of construction. However, jet flights were a relatively new phen-
omenon in 1946, when the opinion was written, so that perhaps the problem
was not then too severe.2 6 To say at present that the courts should not act
because Congress might is to leave uncompensated those now suffering
an apparently unconstitutional burden.
27
22 Instant case at 583.
23 Id. at 585.
24 The court attempted to distinguish Richards by saying that the smoke and
fumes from the tunnel were "intentionally directed" to the claimant's property in that
case. Instant case at 585.
25328 U.S. 256, 274-75 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent did recognize
the need for relief, but limited the courts' proper function to the awarding of damages
on tort principles. However, this is little help when the United States is the de-
fendant. At the time of the Causby case, the Federal Tort Claims Act had not been
enacted. Even with its passage it probably would not have provided a remedy in
the present case, since the location of air bases and the specification of the necessary
maintenance operations and safe flight levels are undoubtedly discretionary govern-
mental decisions, and therefore come within the exceptions to liability. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1958). If it were possible to move the disturbing activities to other parts
of the base, thereby reducing the interference, the failure to do this would probably
be actionable under the act.
2 6 American military jet aircraft were first operational in 1944; jet passenger
service began in 1952. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 46a-46b (1957).
27Many state constitutions now provide for compensation for "damage" as well
as "taking," thereby removing any doubt that compensation is to be paid in circum-
stances like those of the present case. See 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.44
(3d ed. 1950).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-DISTRICT COURT DIRECTED NOT To
GIVE EFFECT TO CUBAN DECREES IF CONFISCATORY OR VIOLATIVE OF
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE
Plaintiffs, Cuban nationals residing in the United States, brought an
action against defendant insurance company-a domestic corporation-to
recover the cash surrender value of policies issued by defendant to plaintiffs
while residents of Cuba.' Subsequent to plaintiffs' departure, the Cuban
government issued a decree purporting to transfer to itself title to all of
plaintiffs' assets including the insurance policies. The district court
2 dis-
missed the action on defendant's plea of forum non conveniens.3 The court
of appeals held that the district court had erred in dismissing the action,
4
and, holding the act of state doctrine inapplicable,8 remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the Cuban decrees were "confiscatory or
whether the particular decrees [were] otherwise violative of fundamental
concepts of justice and, therefore, without status . . . ,, Rodriguez v.
Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3253 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1963) (No. 792).
The act of state doctrine, more a principle of conflict of laws 7 than a
rule of international public law,8 is essentially a policy of judicial restraint.9
Those courts which adhere to the doctrine refuse to inquire into the validity
of the acts of a foreign state.10 Of the several exceptions to the doctrine,
the most important is that it is not applied when the executive branch of
the government waives its objections to judicial examination of foreign
decrees in a particular case." Moreover, unless specifically requested by
' The policies were accepted by defendant company in New Orleans, La., and
provided that payment was to be in United States currency. The company, however,
continued to accept payment in Cuban pesos when the Batista government ordered that
all obligations should be paid in Cuban currency.
2 The action was originally brought in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County,
Florida, but was removed by defendant to the United States district court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.
3 The defendant argued that the transaction was governed by Cuban law and
therefore more conveniently litigable in Cuba.
4 The court of appeals held that the dismissal was improper since the defendant
had made no showing that the plaintiffs could "obtain justice in the courts of Cuba."
Instant case at 433.8 Id. at 436.
0 Ibid.
R1!ESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, comment b
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
8 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3260 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963) (No. 403); BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 213 (2d ed. 1962); RESTATEmENTI, op. cit. supra note 7, § 41, com-
ment g; cf. Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826, 827 (1959).
9 See INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTs 64 (Proceedings of the Third
Summer Conference on Int'l Law, Cornell Law School, 1960); Comment, The Act
of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and Public International Law, 62 CLUm.
L. REv. 1278, 1286 (1962).
10 See Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
16 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 1, 34 (1962).
"1 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir.
1962); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr&res, S.A., 163 F2d 246, 249-55 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 73.
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the executive to apply the doctrine, courts will examine the validity of
foreign penal decrees 12 or those which purport to affect the status of prop-
erty situated beyond the acting nation's jurisdiction. 13 In addition, the act
of state doctrine is theoretically not applicable to the acts of an unrecognized
government; 14 however, the continuing vitality of this exception is
questionable.15
In the present case, the court of appeals, relying on Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino,16 held the act of state doctrine inapplicable. The court
in Sabbatino, having received what it interpreted as State Department ap-
proval of judicial inquiry,17 had refused to apply the act of state doctrine
to the Cuban decrees which formed the basis of the plaintiff's claim.18
Instead, it examined the decrees, and, finding them violative of inter-
national law,19 dismissed the complaint. In the present case, the court did
not request and therefore did not receive any communique from the State
Department.2° The court stated that it had made no request because the
State Department had made its position vis-a-vis judicial inquiry into the
validity of Cuban nationalization decrees quite clear in the past.21  How-
ever, because the State Department's prior pronouncements were some-
what equivocal,2 2 the present court's reliance upon them may not have been
12 See Bollack v. Soci&6 Gn6ral, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1942) ;
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 102, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (dictum); DIcEY,
CONFLICT Or LAWs 667 (7th ed. 1958); RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 41,
comment f. A penal decree has been defined as one "directed against the property
of a particular person or of the members of a particular social class, or of persons
of a particular race or a particular alien nationality." DIcEy, op. cit. supra at 667.
13 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 46. See Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank
of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), aff'd per curiam
by an equally divided court, 309 U.S. 624 (1940); BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS
405-06 (2d ed. 1952). State objections to the extraterritorial effect of a foreign
decree, however, may be overridden by a treaty. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942).
14 BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 405.
'5 See Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929),
aff'd sub ntom. Banque de France v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 60 F2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932) ;
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Wulfsohn
v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923);
RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 48 (1951); Borchard, The
Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 261, 264 (1932).
16 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
17The communiqu6 received from the State Department was somewhat am-
biguous. It stated: "Whether or not these nationalizations will in the future be
given effect in the United States is, of course, for the courts to determine" Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 16, at 858. A subsequent letter concluded:
"the Department should not comment on matters pending before the courts." Ibid.
18 Ibid.
9 Id. at 867. There is, however, some dispute as to whether the court in Sab-
batino should have applied international law standards. See RESTATEMENT, op. Cit.
supra note 7, § 44, comment b. Compare Falk, supra note 10, at 10, 37-39, with
14 N.Y.C.B.A. RECORD 37 (Supp., Oct. 1959).
20 Instant case at 435.
21 Ibid.
2 2 See note 17 supra.
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justified. There is some dispute as to whether the judiciary applies the
act of state doctrine in the absence of direct executive intervention,s or
whether it only applies the doctrine if specifically requested to do so; 24 but
the weight of authority supports the former procedure.25 One commentator
has stated: "An express mandate from the State Department should be
required as a minimum condition precedent to a departure from the usual
standard of respect given to a foreign act of state so long as peace prevails
between the nations." 26
Once a court has made the initial determination that judicial inquiry
is in order, it faces the more difficult task of ascertaining the standards by
which the foreign sovereign's acts are to be evaluated. There are three
sources from which a court in this situation might draw 2 7-the constitu-
tion of the foreign nation which enacted the decree,28 public policy of the
forum, 2 or international law.30  In Sabbatino, the court applied standards
derived from international law; the nationalization decrees were refused
recognition not because they effected a nationalization per se, but because
of their discriminatory and retaliatory nature.31 The decrees were re-
taliatory in that they were promulgated on the same day that Congress
amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to reduce Cuba's quota, and discriminatory
because they were directed solely against American property
3 2
23 See cases cited note 11 supra; INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL CoURTs,
op. cit. mpra note 9, at 91.
2 4 See id. at 78; Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 41, 42 (1945)
(concurring opinion), in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
It is my view, in, short, that courts should not disclaim jurisdiction which
otherwise belongs to them in relation to vessels owned by foreign govern-
ments however operated except when "the department of the government
charged with the conduct of our foreign relations," or of course Congress,
explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these relations calls for judicial
abstention.
2 See cases cited note 11 mspra; RESTATEmENT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 41.26 Falk, supra note 10, at 22.
27 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL CoURTs, op. cit. upmra note 9, at 71.
28 However, conformity with domestic law has never been considered an adequate
defense to an international claim. See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 62; RF.sTATE-
MENT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 169, comments a-d. Cf. Tinoco (Great Britain v. Costa
Rica), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1923).
29 See, e.g., Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 378,
189 N.E. 456, 460 (1934) ; Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 273
App. Div. 224, 234, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43, aff'd per curiam, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106
(1948).
30 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F2d 845 (1962).
81 Id. at 859-69. The court declined to decide Whether failure to provide adequate
compensation for property taken violates international law. Id. at 864.
3 2 The Cuban government, in its decree, resolved to
order the nationalization, through compulsory expropriation, and, therefore,
the adjudication in fee simple to the Cuban State, of all property and enter-
prises located in the national territory, and the rights and interests resulting
from the exploitation of such property and enterprises, owned by the juri-
dical persons who are nationals of the United States of North America, or
operators of enterprises in which nationals of said country have a predomi-
nating interest, as listed below ....
Id. at 849.
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The present case appears to depart significantly from the international
law approach of Sabbatino. Under the mandate of the court of appeals,
the district court, to hold the decrees unenforceable, has only to find that
they are confiscatory or violative of fundamental concepts of justice.
3 3
In making this determination, a district court judge will likely be predis-
posed to employ due process notions of "fundamental fairness." 34 Quite
clearly, judged by domestic constitutional standards, the Cuban decrees
denied plaintiffs due process. 35 Therefore, if this were the sole factor
considered by the district court, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover.
If, however, the district court were to apply international law, the plain-
tiffs' claim might have to be dismissed. Generally, under international
law, a nation may seize with impunity the property of its own nationals
located within its jurisdiction.36 This rule is primarily based on the con-
cept that each nation is sovereign within its own territory.37 In the present
case, the court apparently rejected the fundamental distinction which inter-
national law makes between the acts of a sovereign affecting its own na-
tionals and those which may injure foreign nationals. 8
In the United States, domestic standards of fundamental fairness as
embodied in the due process clauses of the Constitution are more exacting
than any international law standard which the court might have adopted. 39
In some nations, however, domestic notions of fairness may fall below the
international law norm. 40 Employment by American courts of a consistent
33 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
34 See Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) : "[N]or should we forget
that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a
foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction." Cf. McDouGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 968 (1960). See generally, Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect
of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 619 (1954).
The transfer of title was effectuated by the "mere publication of the names
of those persons whose property was declared to be confiscated." Instant case at 431.
See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
36 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, 253 (Aden
Sup. Ct.); Princess Paley v. Olga & Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718; FRIEDMAN, EXPRO-
PRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1953) ; Zander, supra note 7, at 837.
371 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 733 (2d ed. 1945).
38 In the instant case, the court said, "it matters not whether the thrust of those
decrees be directed against Cuban nationals or American citizens." Instant case at
436. See cases cited note 36 supra.
39 For example, Mexican notions of fundamental fairness were not violated when
an American national, tried in Mexico, lacked the assistance of counsel, had no inter-
preter, and was not given the right to confront government witnesses. Chattin
(United States v. Mexico), United States-Mexico General Claims Comm'n 422
(1927). In contrast, in the United States the right to counsel is guaranteed in the
federal system, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and in the state system in
capital offenses. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, even in the
state system, a denial of counsel in a noncapital prosecution may constitute a vio-
lation of due process. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). The right of con-
frontation is guaranteed by U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
40 See generally BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
(1915).
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international law standard in multinational cases might encourage other
nations to do the same and incidentally to raise their domestic notions of
fairness at least to the international level. While judicial notions of what
that international law standard is may initially be tempered by a domestic
bias,4 1 the eventual evolution of uniform case law in this area, facilitated
by the existence of more readily ascertainable standards, would both clarify
and objectify the rules of international law.
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE-UNITED STATES DISTRICT Oo-UT
HELD To HAVE EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY FIGIN ATTORNEY FOR
DELAYED FILaNG OF PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
Counsel for defendant in a personal injury action in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was ten months late in filing a
pretrial memorandum.' Pursuant to one of the court's standing orders,2
the district judge imposed a $100 fine on the offending attorney The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that the
district court had exceeded its authority by fining an attorney who had
not been held in contempt. The dissenting judges contended that the
4 1 See BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 88 (5th ed. 1955): "[A] national court can
only apply its own version of what the rule of international law is, and that however
objectively it may try to approach a question which raises an issue of international
law, its views will inevitably be influenced by national factors." See also Falk, supra
note 10, at 10; in Sabbatino, the court expressly warned against conscious introduc-
tion of such a bias. 307 F.2d at 861.
7 A standing order in effect in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania provides:
3. . . . Not later than 30 days after the publishing of . . . [a civil pre-
trial] list, counsel for plaintiff shall file a written pre-trial memorandum
Within 30 days of receipt of such pretrial memorandum, all counsel
served with plaintiff's memorandum shall file a written pre-trial memo-
randum .. ..
LocAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA app. at 5, 1 FED. RULES SERv. 2D'1183 (1958).
2 The order-Imposition of Sanctions With Respect to Pre-Trial Procedures-,
adopted Feb. 8, 1960, includes the following provision: "For failure to . . . prepare
. . . [for a pretrial conference], the Court, in its discretion, may make such order
with respect to the imposition of fines, costs and counsel fees, as is just and proper
.... " LocAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DIsTRIcT OF PENNSYLVANIA app. at 10, 3 FED. RULES SEarv. 2D 1154 (1960).
3The judge also entered an order precluding the defendant from calling certain
witnesses at the trial and permitting plaintiff to request costs occasioned by the delay.
Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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standing order was valid either under the local rulemaking power of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or as a reasonable exercise of the court's
inherent powers. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied sub non. District Court v. Mahoney, 371 U.S.
888 (1962).
One of the greatest problems facing courts today is that of overcrowded
dockets 4 Effective pretrial conferences can help to alleviate this condition
by facilitating the settlement of cases before trial and by narrowing the
issues in cases that do reach trial.5 The conference itself, however, be-
comes only another source of court congestion when counsel do not ade-
quately prepare for it. Requiring pretrial memoranda, as did the district
court in the instant case, is an effective means of forcing counsel to prepare
for the conference; but if this, or any other pretrial requirement, is to be
meaningful, the courts must impose penalties upon those who fail to
comply.
6
In enforcing these requirements, the district courts have used various
sanctions, including dismissal 7grant of a new trial,8 holding that plaintiff
had waived his right to demand jury trial 9 and a preclusion order.' 0
These sanctions have in common two major disadvantages. In the first
place, they penalize clients for defaults most often caused by the neglect or
delay of their attorneys. Secondly, the impact of such penalties is so
drastic that their use is generally inhibited and at times invalidated."
Much of their potential deterrent power is dissipated because they are
infrequently and irregularly invoked. The advantages of assessing a fine
such as that imposed in the instant case are readily apparent. Not only
can its severity be correlated to the particular situation simply by adjusting
the amount, but further, a fine will penalize the attorney without injuring
his client's case. 12  Thus the district court's action should be viewed as
a reasonable attempt to vindicate and effectuate its pretrial procedure.
4 See generally LEVlIN & WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961) ; ZEISEL, KALVFN & BUcHHOLz,
DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); ATrTY GEN. CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION &
DELAY iN LITIGATION, PROCEEDINGS (1956).
5 3 MooRE, FEDEAL PRACTICE f 16.02 (2d ed. 1948).
6 See LEVIN & WOOLLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 69.
7Link v. Wabash I-R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
8 Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571 (D. Ore. 1941).
)In re 1208, Inc., 3 FED. RULES SERv. 2D 16.43 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
10 Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959).
"1 Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961), 110 U. PA. L. REv.
446 (1962) (under circumstances of case, preclusion order held too drastic). See
also Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, AMENDMENTS TO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, ADOPTED BY U.S.
SUP. CT. JAN. 21, 1963, in 83 Sup. Ct. No. 7, at 33 (Special Section, Feb. 1, 1963).
12 But note that the district judge in the instant case imposed other sanctions
in addition to the fine. See note 3 supra.
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Appellant's action clearly did not give the district court ground to
exercise its contempt power; 13 the only issue presented by this case was
whether the court had any other authority under which to impose the fine.
The court of appeals rejected the contention that Rule 83 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing rulemaking by district courts,14 was
an appropriate source of power, on the ground that the fine was a "basic
disciplinary innovation" 15 and called "for mature consideration by the
. . . Supreme Court's advisory committee." 16 To support this contention
the court cited Miner v. Atlass,'7 in which the Supreme Court held that a
district court was without power to order, by local rule,' the taking of
oral depositions in admiralty cases. However, the alteration effected by
the district court in Miner was of a more drastic nature than the fine in the
instant case because discovery by means of oral deposition had intentionally
been omitted from the Admiralty Rules.19 Nevertheless, rejection of Rule
83 can be defended on the ground that the local rulemaking power should
not be used to authorize the imposition of a fine when the contempt statute
seemingly limits that power.2° The court of appeals also refused to accept
the imposition of the fine as an exercise of the district court's inherent
powers, stating that "absent authority, the district court's power to penalize
appellant is limited by the contempt statute." 21 A careful reading of the
opinion, however, reveals that the decision in fact turned on the punitive
nature of a penalty in the form of a fine payable to the United States and
invoked by the district court as a matter of judicial discretion. This is not
13 "The trial judge did not regard the attorney's default as constituting contempt
of the court . . . ." Instant case at 731. "[T]hese proceedings are of a different
nature from those for criminal contempt." Instant case at 736 (Biggs, C.J., dis-
senting). The contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958) reads:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
The first subsection requires an actual obstruction. In re McConniell, 370 U.S. 230,
234 (1962). The second subsection is not applicable to an attorney. Cammer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956). The third subsection is inapplicable since it
has been construed as requiring willful disobedience and appellant's action was con-
cededly an oversight See United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., 163 F2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947). See generally Frankfurter & Landis, Power of
Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. Rsv.. 1010 (1924).
14 "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules." FED. R. Crv. P. 83.
15 Instant case at 732.
'6 Ibid.
17 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
IsADMI.ALTY R. 44, which is similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
19 Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 644-45 (1960).
2 See Frankdurter & Landis, supra note 13, at 1024-29.
21 Instant case at 732.
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to suggest that the result rested only on semantics. A stigma can, and in
this case does, attach solely on the basis of wording. There is no evidence
that a discretionary punitive fine, payable to the United States, has ever
been imposed to vindicate a court's authority except in cases of criminal
contempt.22  Viewed in this light, the action of the district court can be
considered a criminal conviction without trial.2
However, more important than the correctness of the instant decision
is the impact it will have upon other sanctions, adopted as local rules, which
seek to effectuate pretrial without injuring the litigant. The Southern
District of California has incorporated into pretrial a procedure whereby
counsel may submit a motion for costs under section 1927 of the Judicial
Code which provides that "any attorney . . . who so multiplies the pro-
ceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may
be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs." 24 Since
this is a congressional grant of power, there is no question of the court's
authority to impose such a sanction. However, it is doubtful whether this
statute would be applicable to most infractions of pretrial procedure which
cannot be said to multiply proceedings and "unreasonably and vexatiously"
increase costs. Further, this sanction is invoked upon motion of opposing
counsel, who, fearful of the day when the situation could be reversed, might
well refuse to press for such an award.2 5
The solution adopted by the judges of the Western District of Penn-
sylvania is to offer the offending attorney the opportunity of paying a fine
to the court's library fund as an alternative to the imposition of, for ex-
ample, a preclusion order.26 However, the instant case casts serious doubt
upon any pretrial sanction labeled "fine". Arguably, the library fine is
distinguishable from that in the instant case in that the fine is not payable
to the United States, and the court is not imposing the fine upon the
attorney, since the latter may elect the alternative sanction. However, pay-
ment of a fine to a recipient other than the United States is likely to be
unacceptable. In any event, it is really a fiction to say that money paid to
the library of a court of the United States is not paid to the United States.
22 See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) ; Union Tool Co. v. Wilson,
259 U.S. 107 (1922).' One of the few federal courts to actually define a fine gave the
following definition: "A fine is a pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful tribunal
upon a person convicted of crime or misdemeanor." United States v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 140 F.2d 834, 839 (10th Cir. 1944).
23The result in the instant case could therefore be said to be compelled by the
requirements of due process.
2428 U.S.C. § 1927 (1958), adopted by S.D. CAL. LoCAL R. 9(i), in Seminar on
Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 625-26 (1958).
25 See Mcllvaine, Compliance by Counsel-A District Judge's Views as to the
Means of Insuring Compliance by Counsel With the Pretrial Procedures, 29 F.R.D.
408, 411 (1962). See also LEviN & WOOLLEY, op. cit. sucpra note 4, at 27, 72. Plain-
tiff's counsel in the instant case urged the trial judge not to impose a fine upon de-
fendant's counsel. Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Certiorari, p. 17a, instant case.
26 See McIlvaine, supra note 25, at 411. The library fund is established under
local rule 28 and is in the custody of a trustee with power in the Chief Judge to draw
upon the fund. 20 FFD. RuLEs SEav. 967 (1954).
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Nor can much weight be given to the attorney's election. No responsible
attorney will refuse to pay a fine when such action may well cost him a case.
Indeed, it is questionable whether the attorney should be placed in the
position of electing whether he or his client shall be penalized.
The Southern District of New York takes a third approach. A local
rule provides that "if counsel fails to comply with any of the Calendar
Rules . . . the judge . . . may . . . assess reasonable costs directly
against counsel 27 whose action has obstructed the effective administration
of the court's business." 2 8 Although the rule does not so state, it appears
that these costs would be payable to the court since the criterion is the
obstruction of the court's business. Thus, unlike section 1927. the effec-
tiveness of this sanction would not depend upon a motion being made by
opposing counsel32 However, since costs imposed under this rule are
obviously in the nature of punishment, it can be asserted that this is no
more than a change of labels and therefore indistinguishable from the
instant case. Yet, the decision in the instant case does rest upon the sub-
stantive significance of the "fine" label. There is no stigma associated with
"costs," and their imposition presents no apparent conflict with the contempt
statute. o Further, the Miner problem 3 ' does not arise because there is no
evidence of an intentional omission of costs as a sanction for pretrial viola-
tions. Moreover, the fact that costs are often used as a deterrent indicates
that they are an acceptable non-criminal sanction.32 Thus, it seems that
the Southern District's rule should be considered a valid exercise of the
local rulemaldng power. Since the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's rule
already provides for the imposition of costs,- the effect of the instant case
may be mitigated by the adoption of a practice similar to that of New York.
27 Thus, ethically, counsel could not pass the costs on to his client as an expense
of litigation.
28S.D.N.Y. LocAL Pt 16(c), 4 Fm. RuLEs SEav. 2D 1163 (1961). "Calendar
rules" refers to local rules of pretrial procedure.
29 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
8o See text accompanying note 20 supra.
81 See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1927 (1958). For an excellent treatment of
the use of costs as a penalty see Note, Use of Taxable Costs To Regulate the Conduct
of Litigants, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 78 (1953).
33 See note 2 supra.
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